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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-VIOLATION OF POLICE DEPARTMENT INTER-
NAL REGULATION CREATES REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLI-
GENCE UNDER STATE EVIDENCE STATUTE. Peterson v. City of Long
Beach, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 594 P.2d 477, 155 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979). Re-
sponding to a radio call erroneously reporting a burglary in progress, a
Long Beach officer shot and killed a suspect fleeing from the scene)
The victim's parents brought this wrongful death action against the of-
ficer and the City of Long Beach on the theory that the officer "acted
negligently and unreasonably in firing to prevent the escape."'2 The
plaintiffs introduced evidence that the officer's conduct violated section
4242 of the Long Beach Police Department's firearms regulations,3 and
argued that the violation created a presumption of negligence. The
trial court, sitting without a jury, found for the defendants. The judge
concluded that, although the officer failed to comply with the firearms
guidelines, section 4242 "does not constitute a minimal standard of
care,"5 and that the officer's conduct was "within the permissible lim-
I. Peterson v. City of Long Beach, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 241, 594 P.2d 477, 478, 155 Cal. Rptr.
360, 361 (1979).
2. Peterson v. City of Long Beach, 72 Cal. App. 3d 852, 140 Cal. Rptr. 401, 403 (1977),
vacated, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 594 P.2d 477, 155 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
3. Section 4242 of the Long Beach Police Department Manual provides, in part, that a fire-
arm shall not be discharged to effect an arrest unless the officer has reason to believe both that the
crime involved violence or the threat of violence and that there is substantial risk that death or
serious bodily harm will result if the person is not arrested.
[I] The policy of the Department governing the display and discharge of firearms is
that members shall exhaust every other reasonable means of apprehension before resort-
ing to the use of a firearm.
[II A] An officer shall not discharge a firearm in the performance of his police duties
except under the following circumstances and only after all other means fail:
[3] To effect an arrest, to prevent an escape, or to recapture an escapee when other
means have failed, of an adult felony suspect when the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that (a) the crime for which the arrest is sought involved conduct including the
use or threatened use of deadly force and (b) there is substantial risk that the person
whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily harm if apprehension is delayed.
Jlprintedin Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 368-69,
132 CaL Rptr. 348, 350 (1976).
4. 24 Cal. 3d at 248, 594 P.2d at 483, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 366. A presumption of negligence
means that the first two elements of actionable negligence are proven-the plaintiff owes a duty of
due care and the defendant has breached that duty. See HIL, RoSSEN & SOG, SMITH's REVIEW
OF TORTS 69 (3d ed. 1975).
5. 24 Cal. 3d at 243, 594 P.2d at 479, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
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its" of the justifiable homicide provisions of the California State Penal
Code.6 The Supreme Court of California reversed7 and held- A viola-
tion of a legislatively authorized internal police department firearms
regulation is a violation of a regulation of a public entity and creates,
under the California Evidence Code, a rebuttable presumption of fail-
ure to exercise due care.8
California Evidence Code section 669,9 essentially a codification of
the California common law,' 0 creates a rebuttable presumption of a
failure to exercise due care when a violation of a statute, ordinance, or
6. Id. Homicide isjustifiable if committed by a public officer, "[w]hen necessarily commit-
ted in retaking felons who have been rescued or have escaped, or when necessarily committed in
arresting persons charged with felony, and who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 196 (Deering 1971).
7. The California Supreme Court vacated the appeals court decision, which had reversed
the trial court on other grounds. The appeals court held that Peterson was correctly decided at the
time of the trial, but that a subsequent decision, Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 26 (1977), dictated reversal. The Kortum case, according to the appeals court majority, held
that a police officer is held to the same standard of care as a private citizen, and thus the force used
to apprehend the burglar in Peterson "was excessive as a matter of law." 72 Cal. App. 3d 852, 140
Cal. Rptr. at 404 (1977). The Supreme Court did not reach this issue.
8. 24 Cal. 3d at 241, 549 P.2d at 478, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
9. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (Deering Supp. 1978). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or injury to his person or property was one of the
class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance or regulation was adopted.
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reason-
ably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances,
who desired to comply with the law ....
10. The Law Revision Commission commented:
Section 669 codifies a common law presumption that is frequently applied in the Califor-
nia cases. See Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958). The presumption
may be used to establish a plaintiff's contributory negligence as well as a defendant's
negligence. Nevis v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 43 Cal. 2d 626, 275 P.2d 761 (1954).
Effect of Presumption. If the conditions listed in subdivision (a) are established, a pre-
sumption of negligence arises which may be rebutted by proof of the facts specified in
subdivision (b). The presumption is one of simple negligence only, not gross negligence.
Taylor v. Cockrell, 116 Cal. App. 596, 3 P.2d 16 (1931).
CAL. EvID. CODE § 669 (Deering Supp. 1978) (comment). See also Satterlee v. Orange Glenn
School Dist.. 29 Cal. 2d 581, 589, 177 P.2d 279, 283 (1947) ("violation of an ordinance or statute is
presumptively an act of negligence'); Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal. 2d 418, 425, 170 P.2d 454, 458 (1946)
(failing to light stairway in violation of municipal code held negligence as a matter of law);
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regulation is the proximate cause of the type of injury the statute, ordi-
nance, or regulation sought to prevent" to a person of the class it in-
tended to protect.'
2
Many jurisdictions limit this presumption of negligence to violations
of statutes and ordinances and regard violations of administrative regu-
lations as mere evidence of negligence.' 3 In contrast section 669 of the
California Evidence Code also covers any violation of a regulation of a
Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418, 420, 421 (1880) (failure to tie horse securely in violation of statute
held evidence of negligence or more; should not have left question to jury; proof fully established).
The California common law presumption of negligence did not result in absolute liability; the
defendant could introduce evidence ofjustification or excuse. Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School
Dist., 29 Cal. 2d at 589, 177 P.2d at 283.
An act which is performed in violation of an ordinance or statute is presumptively an act
of negligence, but the presumption is not conclusive and may be rebutted by showing
that the act was justifiable or excusable under the circumstances. . . . However, the fact
which will excuse the violation of a statute has been defined by the court as one resulting
"from causes or things beyond the control of the person charged with the violation."
Id.; see Mula v. Meyer, 132 Cal. App. 2d 279, 284-85, 282 P.2d 107, 110, 112 (1955).
A statutory violation gives rise in most states to negligence "per se." RESTATEMLNT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 288B, Comment a (1965). The statute must meet essentially the same criteria as that
outlined in California Evidence Code § 669, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965),
and liability may be avoided through defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of
the risk, id. § 288B, Comment b, or excused in emergency or other comparable situations, id.
§ 288A.
11. Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 183, 496 P.2d 1276, 1284, 101 Cal. Rptr.
908, 916 (1972) (purpose of statute to protect public property and assure adequate lighting, not to
prevent injury or death from electrocution; thus § 669(a)(3) requirement is not satisfied); Nun-
neley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal. 2d 493, 498, 225 P.2d 497, 500 (1950) (statute speciflying minimum
height of parapet designed to prevent injuries occurring from walking or stumbling into opening,
not from sitting on parapet; height not relevant to danger presented from sitting); Miglierini v.
Havemann, 240 Cal. App. 2d 570, 573, 49 Cal. Rptr. 795, 797 (1966) (purpose of statute to prevent
loss from damage to unattended vehicle, not to protect owner from personal injury); CAL. EvID,
CODE § 669(a)(3) (Deering Supp. 1978).
12. Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 183, 496 P.2d 1276, 1284, 101 Cal. Rptr.
908, 916 (1972) ("[A]s section 585 [prohibiting the extinguishing of any public light] evidently
sought to protect the street-using public, by assuring adequate street lighting, it cannot be said that
[plaintiff apartment tenant who unscrewed street-light bulb] was, under section 669 [(a)(4)], one of
the class of persons for whose protection the ordinance was adopted."); see Richards v. Stanley, 43
Cal. 2d 60, 62, 271 P.2d 23, 25 (1954) (statute requiring removal of ignition keys not designed to
protect person injured by thief driving car); Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal. 2d 493, 497, 225
P.2d 497, 500 (1950) (plaintiff hotel guest is within class of persons meant to be protected by
statute requiring minimum height of parapet around hotel roof vent shaft); CAL. EviD. CODE
§ 669(a)(4) (Deering Supp. 1978).
13. "More frequently than in the cases of statutes or ordinances, the requirements of admin-
istrative regulations are not adopted by the court as defining a definite standard of conduct in
negligence actions, but are accepted as affording relevant evidence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288B, Comment d (1965).
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public entity. 14 California courts have long held that violations of ad-
ministrative safety regulations give rise to a presumption of negli-
gence 5 but, before this decision, treated police and fire department
internal regulations' 6 as mere evidence for the jury because they did
not view them as regulations of a public entity.
In finding that a violation of section 4242 of the Long Beach Police
Department regulations raises a presumption of negligence, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court decided that the regulation was a regulation of a
public entity to which the presumption of section 669 of the California
Evidence Code applies.' 7 Using a "plain meaning" approach the
majority first looked to the Evidence Code definitions of public entity
and the relevant Law Revision Commission Comment. 8 Under the
code public entity "includes a nation, state, county, city and county,
city, district, public authority, public agency, or any other political sub-
14. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(a)(1) (Deering Supp. 1978).
15. Morris v. Sierra & San Francisco Power Co., 57 Cal. App. 281, 288, 207 P. 262, 265 (1922)
(violation of regulations prescribing distances that.should exist between electric wire negligent as a
matter of law); see Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28
TEX. L. REV. 143, 144-45 (1949).
16. Vallas v. City of Chula Vista, 56 Cal. App. 3d 382, 388, 128 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (1976)
(action against police officer for gunshot injuries; no presumption of negligence under § 669 of the
California Evidence Code because police department regulation is not a regulation of a public
entity): see Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 575, 588, 468 P.2d 825, 831, 86 Cal. Rptr. 465,
471 (1970) (wrongful death action; police manual pertaining to use of firearms admissible as evi-
dence of due care); Dillenbeck v. City of Los Angeles, 69 Cal. 2d 472, 480, 446 P.2d 129, 134, 72
Cal. Rptr. 321, 326 (1968) (wrongful death action against city following collision with police car;,
directives contained in training bulletin safety rules admitted as evidence of standard of care);
Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 2d 35, 38-39, 372 P.2d 906, 907-08, 22 Cal. Rptr. 866, 867-68
(1962) (fire department rules for emergency vehicles admitted into evidence).
Compare the California courts' treatment of company safety rules. "Plaintiff has not cited nor
have we found any case holding that company rules establish a fixed standard of care making
their violation negligence per se. . . . It is well settled that such rules are admissible in evidence
and their violation is a circumstance to be considered in determining negligence." Davis v. John-
son, 128 Cal. App. 2d 466, 472, 275 P.2d 563, 567 (1954). See also Powell v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 35
Cal. 2d 40, 47, 216 P.2d 448, 453 (1950).
17. 24 Cal. 3d at 241, 594 P.2d at 478, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
18. Id. at 244, 594 P.2d at 479, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The Law Revision Commission Com-
ments state: "The broad definition of 'public entity' includes every form of public authority, both
foreign and domestic." CAL. EvID. CODE § 200 (Deering 1966) (comment). The court used this
comment to support the proposition that the term "public entity" was broad enough to encompass
the city police department. 24 Cal. 3d at 244, 594 P.2d at 480, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363. But see CAL.
GOv'r CODE § 811.2 (Deering 1973) (cross referenced from § 200 of Evidence Code). The defini-
tion of public entity, for purposes of claim against that entity "is intended to include every kind of
independent political or governmental entity in the State." Id. Law Revision Commission Com-
ment. (emphasis added).
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division or public corporation, whether foreign or domestic."' 9 This
broad definition, coupled with the express authorization of the Long
Beach City Charter,2 ° led the majority to conclude that the regulation
was that of a public entity.2' The court acknowledged that the legisla-
ture intended that the section codify the common law.22 Although ad-
mitting that most cases applying the common law presumption dealt
with the violation of statutes or ordinances, they observed that many
others involved administrative regulations.23 The majority then noted
that because the trial court refused to treat the regulation violation as
raising a presumption of negligence, it failed to consider whether the
defendant could rebut the presumption as provided in section 669,24 by
19. CAL. EvID. CODE § 200 (Deering 1966).
20. The City Manager and the Chief of Police promulgated § 4242 pursuant to the City
Charter. 24 Cal. 3d at 242 n.2, 594 P.2d at 478 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.2. Section 161 of the
City Charter provided that "[t]he City police department shall be governed at all times by such
rules and regulations as the City Manager may prescribe." Id. (quoting Long Beach Police Of-
ficers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 368, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1976)),
21. 24 Cal. 3d at 244, 594 P.2d at 480, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court disapproved a recent
appellate court decision that, using a similar analysis, found police department regulations not to
be regulations of a "public entity." ld. at 245 n.5, 594 P.2d at 480 n.5, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.5.
In Vallas v. City of Chula Vista, 56 Cal. App. 3d 382, 387-88, 128 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473 (1976), the
court said, "None of the definitions of'public agency' we have been able to find would include a
department of a city as such." Id. It pointed to California Government Code §§ 1151, 4401, 6500,
20009, 53050 and 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COPORATIONS § 2.30 (1971) for support. Section
2.30 provides: "[A] department of a city, created by its charter, is not an entity separate from the
municipality, even though a distinct city department." Id.
22. 24 Cal. 3d at 244, 594 P.2d at 480, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
23. Id. at 244-45, 594 P.2d at 480, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court cited a number of cases in
support:
See, e.g., Levels v. Growers Ammonia Supply (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 443, 447, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 779 [Div. of Ind. Safety order, accord: Short v. State Compensation Ins. Fund
(1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 104, 109, fn. 4, 125 Cal.Rptr. 15]; Atkins v. Bisigier (1971) 16 Cal.
App.3d 414,420,94 Cal.Rptr. 49 [Dept. of Health reg.]; Elton v. County of Orange (1970)
3 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1059, 84 Cal.Rptr. 27 [social welfare regs.]; Nevis v. Pac¢ffc Gas and
Electric Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 626, 629, 275 P.2d 761 [P.U.C. order]; Peterson v.
Permanente Steamship Corp. (1954) 129 Cal.App. 2d 579, 581, 277 P.2d 495 [Coast
Guard reg.]; cf. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. United States (9th Cir. 1949) 173 F.2d
92, 93 [civil aeronautics reg.]; Neiswonger v. Good Year Tire & Rubber Co. (N.D.Ohio
1929) 35 F.2d 761, 763 [Sect. of Commerce rule.]
None of these cases, however, involve departmental regulations governing employee conduct on
the job.
24. 24 Cal. 3d at 247, 594 P.2d at 482, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 365. "Since, as we have shown, his
violation raised a presumption of negligence, he cannot be freed from liability without a judicial
inquiry as to whether he could successfully rebut the presumption." Id.
Whether the officer could have rebutted the presumption is questionable. The dissenting opin-
ion of the appeals court summarized the officer's testimony as follows:
Officer Vershaw further stated that at the time he fired his weapon, he believed that he
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showing that the officer "did what might reasonably be expected of a
person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who
desired to comply with the law."25
The dissent found "arguable" the majority's characterization of the
police department as a public entity,2 6 but based its disagreement on an
interpretation of the class of persons and class of harms the regulation
covered. It concluded that the regulation's promulgators did not intend
to create a standard of care.27 The dissent relied in part on another
recent case involving section 4242 of the Long Beach Police Depart-
ment Manual.28 That court found that the intent of the regulation was
to provide training and guidance and to avoid suits involving claims of
excessive force.29
The majority reached an incorrect result in its effort to impose liabil-
ity for excessive use of deadly force by the police. Even if the stated
purpose of this regulation were to protect suspects resisting arrest from
the excessive use of force by the police, the regulation would not consti-
had no other means to stop [the suspect], and further believed that he was effectuating
the arrest of an adult burglary suspect who was attempting to avoid apprehension; that
he formed his intention to pull the trigger a split second before Peterson was about to
round the comer, that during that split second, the policy of the Long Beach Police
Department relating to the use of firearms did not come to mind;.., that in his police
academy training he was taught that he had a right to use deadly force upon a fleeing
felon by virtue of the provisions of the state Penal Code; that at the moment he fired, he
didn't know whether Peterson had a weapon and didn't know whether there was sub-
stantial risk that the person he was going to arrest would cause death or serious bodily
harm if the apprehension was delayed.
Peterson v. City of Long Beach, 72 Cal. App. 3d 852, 140 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406 (1977), vacated, 24
Cal. 3d 238, 594 P.2d 477, 155 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979). It is clear from this testimony that the officer
could not have argued that he was trying to comply with § 4242. 24 Cal. 3d at 247, 594 P.2d at
481-82, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 669(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 1978).
26. 24 Cal. 3d at 248, 594 P.2d at 482, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
27. "In the trial court's view, to which I fully subscribe, a presumption of negligence properly
cannot be based upon violation of internal, departmental policies which were not intended as
minimum standards of care." Id. at 248, 594 P.2d at 483, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
28. Id.; see Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 132
Cal. Rptr. 348 (1976). In 1976 the Long Beach Police Officers Association, fearing, among other
things, § 4242's probative force in civil suits, sued for injunctive relief to restrain enforcement of
the section. Id. at 367, 369, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 349, 351.
29. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 355. Nevertheless, the appeals court, in address-
ing the effect of § 4242 in a civil suit, recognized that it also was intended as a standard of care.
The court added that the courts had not found liability in the past and that in any event "the
defendant in such a suit is free to argue that the regulation is more stringent than the minimum
standard of care required by law." Id.
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tute a standard of care for the purpose of a negligence action.30 The
specific provision of section 4242 that the officer violated was designed
to protect against an intentional invasion of another's rights;3 1 in a neg-
ligence action "the interest invaded is protected against unintentional
invasion."32 In an action charging the intentional use of excessive force
the regulation might be evidence of the reasonableness of the force.33
In addition the majority dismissed important policy considerations
in a footnote. 4 It did not agree with the concern, which the American
Civil Liberties Union and other organizations expressed in amicus
briefs,35 that "finding iability on the basis of a department rule of con-
30. The trial court in Peterson found that the officer "intentionally discharged his firearm,
killing the decedent." 72 Cal. App. 3d 238, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 410 n.5. The conclusion of law at the
trial was that the officer used justifiable deadly force. Id. The appeals court ruled that the use of
deadly force here was excessive as a matter of law; the court did not use the word negligent. Id.,
140 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
31. See note 3 supra; (§§ 4242 [IIA], 3(a), 3(b)); f Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City
of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 368-69, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350 (1976) (Section 4242[C]
prohibits discharging firearms as a warning or firing at moving vehicles). This section creates a
duty of care to avoid placing others at unnecessary risk. An officer violating this provision would
create a risk of harm; if he injured someone he would be negligent. Even if he did not intend the
consequence, he failed to exercise the standard of care the regulation requires.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(a) (1965); see Mahoney v. Corralejo, 36 Cal.
App. 3d 966, 972, 112 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1974).
California has recognized various degrees of negligence which invoke various legal con-
sequences but as was stated in Donnely v. Southern Pacfic Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, at page
869 [118 P.2d 465]; "A negligent person has no desire to cause the harm that results from
his carelessness,. . . and he must be distinguished from a person guilty of willful mis-
conduct, such as assault and battery, who intends to cause harm. [Citation] Willfulness
and negligence are contradictory terms. . . . If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it
is willful, it is not negligent."
Id. (citations omitted).
33. See Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 575, 588 n.4, 468 P.2d 825, 831 n.4, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 465, 471 n.4 (1970). The plaintiff in Grudt brought an action for wrongful death on alterna-
tive theories of intentional and negligent tort. The court below dismissed the negligence action
and refused to admit a police tactical manual into evidence. Id. at 588, 468 P.2d at 811, 86 Cal.
Rptr. at 471. The supreme court reversed:
Even had the negligence issue been properly excluded from the case, it is arguable that
the manual was relevant to the remaining issue of intentional tort. The rules on the use
of firearms related to the issue of the reasonableness of the force used for self-defense by
the officers-an issue which remained in the case on the cause of action predicated upon
an intentional tort.
Id. at 588 n.4, 468 P.2d at 831 n.4, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.4.
34. 24 Cal. 3d at 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.7.
35. "The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) along with several like organizations ap-
pearing herein as amici curiae implore us to refrain from holding that violation of a police depart-
ment manual may invoke a presumption of negligence." Id. at 249, 594 P.2d at 483, 155 Cal.
Rptr. at 366 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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duct alone will simply deter police departments from making rules of
conduct at all, because of their fear of imposing unnecessary civil lia-
bility."'3 6 These organizations believe that internal regulations are vi-
tally important to controlling police misuse of force.37
The Peterson majority recognized a need to protect the rights of sus-
pects and control the discretion of the police38 and apparently felt that
the threat of civil liabilty for violations of department firearms rules
would effectively deter police misconduct. 9 Police departments
throughout the nation will be looking at this decision and its implica-
tions. We should know soon whether this decision acts as a deterrent
or merely discourages internal rule-making.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-STATE CONSTITU-
TION MAY GUARANTEE BROADER RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH AND Ex-
PRESSION THAN THOSE RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION. Robins Y. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899,
592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 419 (1979)
(No. 79-289). Owners of a private shopping center denied appellants,
who were soliciting signatures on a petition concerning foreign policy,
access to the center.' Appellants sought to enjoin enforcement of the
36. Id. at 246 n.7, 594 P.2d at 481 n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 364 n.7.
37. Accord, K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 6.06, at 150 (3d ed. 1972); Caplan, The
Casefor Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 500 (1971); Safer,
Dead Weapons In The Hands of Police Officers, On Dut
, 
and Off Duty, 49 J. URB. L. 565, 572
(1971).
38. 24 Cal. 3d at 244.46 & n.7, 594 P.2d at 480-81 & n.7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64 & n.7. In its
zeal to protect these rights, the supreme court decided this case on an issue that plaintiff had, as
the dissent notes, abandoned on appeal. Plaintiff accepted the trial court's ruling that the doctrine
of negligence "per se" was not invoked. Id. at 249, 594 P.2d at 483, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 366 (Rich-
ardson, J., dissenting).
39. In imposing liability the court usurped the function of the legislature.
The formulation of a policy governing use of deadly force by police officers is a heavy
responsibility involving the delicate balancing of different interests: the protection of
society from criminals, the protection of police officers' safety, and the preservation of all
human life if possible. This delicate judgment is best exercised by the appropriate legis-
lative and executive officers.
Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 371, 132 Cal. Rptr.
348, 351-52 (1976).
1. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902-03, 592 P. 2d 341, 342, 152
Cal. Rptr. 854, 855, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 419 (1979) (No. 79-289).
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